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ABSTRACT
This study examines how information security burnout can develop from complying with 
organisational security demands, and whether security burnout can be reduced by engaging 
organisational and personal resources. The Job Demands-Resources model was extended to the IT 
security context, to develop and empirically test a security burnout model, using a sample of 443 
participants in Vietnam. The results demonstrate that security task overload and difficult access to 
security requirements increased security burnout while dealing with challenging security requirements 
reduced burnout. Neither organisational resources nor user self-efficacy were effective in reducing 
burnout. Moreover, simple security tasks did not guarantee a burnout-free experience for users. The 
findings emphasise the significance of providing resources and designing security tasks as 
challenging and rewarding experiences, rather than just simply reducing user involvement as a source 
of decreasing cyber security risks. The research establishes a theoretical basis for further studying the 
phenomenon of security burnout and its role in user security management.
Key words: security, human factors, security stress, technology stress, compliance fatigue, IT 
competency 
1. Introduction
Due to rapid deployment of networked enterprise information systems, risks to organisations’ 
information resources are growing. Loss of sensitive information due to the ease of access to 
information online continues to be a major concern for businesses (Li et al., 2014). Organisations 
often implement technical and administrative measures to protect their digital resources and physical 
IT assets (Johnston et al., 2015). A key objective of employing administrative measures, such as 
policies and procedures as well as education and training, is to guide and encourage employees to 
follow safe security practices (e.g. to not share passwords or check suspicious email attachments 
before opening them). In fact, a majority of organisational security problems are indirectly caused by 
employees who violate or neglect the IT policies of their organisations (Warkentin et al., 2007). In 
order to maintain an effective IT system in an ever-changing cyber-security landscape, organisations 
require ongoing security compliance from employees (Renaud and Flowerday, 2017). Thus, employee 
compliance activities are critical (Warkentin and Willison, 2009) when it comes to maintaining a safe 
cyber system. However, users’ low motivation to follow security policies leads to more than 40% of 
security breaches (Johnston et al., 2015). 
There has been previous behavioural security research that examines the actors that affect employees’ 
security practice at work (Crossler et al., 2013). Others have considered security compliance as a rule-
following behaviour, where sanctions and rewards for compliance behaviour were explored (Herath 
and Rao, 2009a; Hu et al., 2011). Additionally, security compliance may be the result of users’ 
strategies applied in order to reduce fear of the consequences of security risks. Protection Motivation 
Theory (PMT) has been employed to explain these types of user responses to cyber risks (Herath and 
Rao, 2009b; Vance and Siponen, 2012). PMT theorises that the need to protect oneself (protection 
motivation) mediates the impact of threat and coping appraisal on protective intentions or behaviours 
(Maddux and Rogers, 1983). For example, a person’s intention to comply with security policies 
would be influenced by the combination of the perceived severity of the threat, perception of 
vulnerability with regard to risks, users’ ability to respond (response efficacy), cost of response, and 
self-efficacy (self-belief in capability to respond) (Crossler et al., 2017). In short, PMT research 
demonstrates that people must be both willing and able to respond to cyber security threats. 
In order to understand willingness and ability, this research aims to better understand the factors that 
influence employees’ security behaviour. With this knowledge, organisations can introduce technical 
preventive measures, policies, security training, regular communications of security risks, or enforce 
sanctions for non-compliance, amongst other strategies designed to improve cyber security safety. In 
addition to motivation, the psychological needs of end-users are also important in the design of 
information security systems. Further, people need to be positively disposed towards the object (i.e. 
cyber safety) in order to strive for it. Thus, the emotions employees feel towards information security 
requirements are significant in a safe cyber security system (Kraus et al., 2017). Additionally the 
knowledge and skills of users are important, which is why a premise of other research is that people 
with better security skills and risk awareness will be more likely to comply with security policies; and 
if they are fearful of sanctions, people will be less likely to violate security policies (Guo and Yuan, 
2012; Vance and Siponen, 2012). 
However, fulfilling increasing security controls and requirements requires additional effort, time, and 
skills, which can lead to employees’ security compliance stress, especially when such activities are 
extended over time (Furnell and Thomson, 2009; Lee et al., 2016). Employees may find security 
controls inconvenient, tedious, and difficult to follow as well as impeding their work (Pham et al., 
2016). Complying with security controls is an energy-draining process that leads to security fatigue in 
which it simply gets too hard or burdensome for users to maintain security (Furnell and Thomson, 
2009). Regularly dealing with security controls such as system updates and notifications from 
firewalls, antivirus software and access controls, without much evidence of their effectiveness and 
necessity, can reduce security attention, and can therefore result in negative attitudes toward security 
tasks, hence lowering users’ overall security performance (Day et al., 2017; Furnell and Thomson, 
2009). Consequently, security requirements themselves can become a source of discouraging 
employees’ security compliance due to the demands (e.g. time, effort, frustration) on them (Pham et 
al., 2016, Posey et al., 2011a). 
Information security stress has recently gained attention in behavioural security research. For 
example, Lee et al. (2016) examined security stress caused by work overload and privacy invasion 
from an individual’s perspective, and how individual’s security knowledge and their understanding of 
perceived threats can mitigate stress. D'Arcy et al. (2014) extended the techno-stress phenomenon to 
examine security-related stress caused by security overload, complexity and uncertainty. They found 
that such stress increases security violations. In a further study on the effects of stress on compliance, 
Pham et al. (2016) employed a qualitative approach in examining security burnout, which is a form of 
physical and psychological exhaustion over performing security-related tasks. The study also explored 
the organisational resources that support employees’ security compliance. These studies have 
affirmed that stress from information security compliance exists and can negatively affect users’ 
continued efforts in taking appropriate security measures. However, little research appears to have 
addressed how information security stress can be mitigated from both individual and organisational 
perspectives.
In this study, we aims to establish a theoretical basis for further studying the phenomenon of security 
burnout and its role in security management. We argue that security burnout may occur because of the 
combination of high and complex security demands where the individual lacks resources 
(organisational and personal) to cope with those demands. We aim to examine the impact of security 
demands on security burnout and examine to what extent organisational and personal resources can 
mitigate security stress based on the Job Demands-Resources (JD-R) model, a work stress theory 
(Demerouti et al., 2001). 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. First, we review security compliance burnout, sources 
of burnout, and factors that may mitigate burnout and stress. We then introduce the theoretical model 
and hypotheses and explain the research design, before presenting the results. Finally, we discuss the 
study’s theoretical and practical implications, along with some suggestions for future research. 
2. Literature review
Work-related stress is a major contributor to lower levels of productivity and compliance with 
organisational requirements. Measuring work-stress has often been undertaken via the JD-R model. It 
posits that employees’ performance and well-being can be affected by both job demands and the 
resources available to support those demands. Individuals’ performance and coping capacities are 
moderated via the competing motivational processes of work burnout and engagement (Demerouti et 
al., 2001). In later research, personal resources such as self-efficacy and experience have been 
included in the extended JD-R model as a moderating factor between demands, resources, burnout 
and engagement that influence job performance, commitment and satisfaction (Bakker et al., 2010; 
Bandura, 1997; Toner et al., 2012). Both personal resources and organisational resources are used to 
comply with the demands of the job. If the job requirements demand more resources than there are 
available, negative stress and burnout can occur.  Burnout describes a state of mental weariness, 
which includes two dimensions, exhaustion and cynicism, reflecting a distant attitude towards work 
(Schaufeli and Bakker, 2004). The concept of job demands and associated burnout can be extended to 
security demands and compliance burnout due to the fulfilment of security demands (Lee et al., 2016). 
A key component of the JD-R model is job demands, which covers the physical, social, or 
organisational aspects of a job. Examples of job demands are work overload, complexity and job 
insecurity (Demerouti et al., 2001). The higher the job demands, the greater the effort, including the 
physical and psychological costs, that an employee must spend to achieve their goals, maintain 
performance and prevent psychological exhaustion (Day et al., 2017; Lavoie-Tremblay et al., 2010). 
As a result of high demands, unremitting fulfilment of job demands can incur prolonged physical and 
psychological costs, eventually leading to work burnout – a negative psychological state. Work 
burnout is a main determinant of undesirable employee behaviour, such as low work productivity and 
deviance (Gilboa et al., 2008), negative job strain and impaired health (Demerouti et al., 2009), as 
well as psychological distress (Bruck et al., 2002). 
Complying with security requirements can require additional effort and time, which can lead to 
physical and psychological exhaustion over extended time periods (Demerouti et al., 2001). Few 
studies have examined how users develop cognitive and emotional stress due to continuing fulfillment 
of security demands. The impact of stressful security demands on security behaviour can be assessed 
under the phenomenon of technology-stress caused by human cognitive limitations and inability to 
adapt to rapid advances in technology (Shu et al., 2011). Information overload, as well as uncertainty 
and complexity of information systems can lead to technology stress in IT users, which may 
negatively influence technology use and productivity (Salanova et al., 2013). Under technology-stress, 
employees can feel negative affective experiences, such as exhaustion, scepticism and inefficacy 
towards the use of ICT, which then reduces professional commitment and undermines effective use of 
the technology. 
There is a significant lack of information system literature that explores what aspects of security 
demands constitute negative or stressful compliance requirements that can affect security behaviour 
(D'Arcy et al., 2014). The nature of security tasks (i.e. complex, stressful and continuously changing) 
can cause burnout and increase moral and/or affective disengagement, which may lead to security 
non-compliance. In this study security compliance burnout refers to psychological exhaustion and 
cynicism toward complying with assigned security tasks and exercising security precautions. We 
conceptualise that burnout is due to the existence of high security demands and lack of resources, 
employees experience burnout as an energy-draining process that results in fatigue and cynical views 
about security programs. Such negative psychological affective experiences can reduce cognitive 
attention and focus, as well as commitment to performing security compliance tasks.
However, the JD-R model does not include relevant predictors of employees’ work burnout 
(Crawford et al., 2010), nor does the model specify which resources are effective in safeguarding 
against burnout. Measuring security burnout in practice is still a challenge and lacks a solid theoretical 
framework to identify its sources. Earlier work has identified a number of contributing factors such as 
sustained effort, difficulty and perceived importance of security tasks (Furnell and Thomson, 2009). 
Similarly, no specific security resources have been identified that effectively reduce security demands 
associated with physical and psychological costs in achieving individual security requirements. This 
study endeavours to develop a model that details sources of security demands and resources 
(organisational and personal) contributing to security compliance burnout. 
The following sections present analysis of key components of the JD-R model in the context of 
security compliance considering its organisational and individual personal characteristics.
2.1. Organisational security demands, resources and security compliance 
burnout
Security demands are tasks and procedures that employees must perform as part of their work 
responsibilities, such as accessing security policies for instructions and guidance, acquiring the skills 
and knowledge employees need to deal with changing security environments, and using security 
measures (Vacca, 2013). Coping with overloading security demands can increase compliance burnout, 
because security demands put time pressure on employees to complete other job duties (D'Arcy et al., 
2014). People can view security tasks as inconvenient, work hindering and time-consuming, making 
them a legitimate reason for not utilising a security measure (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Schneier, 2008). 
For example, an automated virus scan can disrupt an employee’s intended work task because his or 
her computer slows down during the scan. Impeding work was reported to increase the perceived cost 
of compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010), and negatively impact compliance intentions (Dhillon and 
Torkzadeh, 2006; Vance and Siponen, 2012). One of the most common issues with security demands 
is that security compliance can negatively affect employees’ work and consequently reduce their 
productivity (Pham et al., 2016). Security compliance overload refers to the amount of time and effort 
needed to perform security tasks in the working time available, which reduces an employee’s 
productivity and increases their stress levels. 
Security compliance burnout reflects both the psychological exhaustion and cynicism towards 
assigned security tasks and security precautions. Burnout can occur when people have been 
overloaded for extended periods of time. Performing a high and/or frequent number of security 
measures requires IT users to spend extra time and handle workflow disruption, while still being 
required to quickly respond to other work demands. This can create anxiety and tension, as well as 
make sustained mental attention difficult, thus reducing security efforts overall (Salanova et al., 2013). 
Hence, we hypothesise the following: 
H1: Security compliance overload is positively related to security compliance burnout
Security policies provide formal guidelines and resources that specify user responsibilities when 
dealing with organisational information (von Solms and von Solms, 2004). Users need to access 
security policies for relevant information about their compliance needs. Boss et al. (2009) also 
acknowledge the importance of providing clear security specifications in order to achieve desired 
security compliance. Perceived quality and usefulness of security policies positively affected actual 
security compliance (Pahnila et al., 2007). However, employees commonly identified the need to 
access traditional written IT and security policies as a source of frustration and disengaging (Pham et 
al., 2016). That study also found that written policies were of little use in providing security practice 
guidance, and were considered as lengthy and difficult to read due to the use of unfamiliar terms. 
Accordingly, we hypothesise that:  
H2: The need to access security policies is positively related to security compliance burnout
To fulfil security requirements, which can vary in complexity, users may need to acquire a certain 
level of computer and/or security knowledge and to spend time in applying security measures to their 
systems (Ashenden and Lawrence, 2013). Compliance burnout also occurs when security tasks 
require extra time, computer experience and/or security knowledge which employees may not possess 
(Pham et al., 2016), and this lack of skill can lead to stress (D'Arcy et al., 2014). In other words, an 
imbalance between a person’s capabilities and security demands can also create stress or burnout, 
either when there is an anticipation of negative consequences due to inadequate responses (Chen et 
al., 2012-2013), or the requirements exceed one’s capabilities and personal resources (Posey et al., 
2011b). Thus, we hypothesise:
H3: High security skill requirements are positively related to security compliance burnout
Organisational resources are the physical, social or organisational aspects of the job that help facilitate 
achievement of work goals by reducing job demands’ associated costs, and promoting personal 
growth and development (Demerouti et al., 2001). Depending on the nature of security demands, 
users may need different resources to comply properly. Perceptions about the organisation’s security 
response efficacy are a factor in motivating employees to take protective measures against security 
threats (Ifinedo, 2011; Vance et al., 2012). The resources and security measures that an organisation 
provides to facilitate employees’ security compliance can reduce the demands on the individual’s IT 
efforts and also demonstrate the effectiveness of organisational security measures. Furthermore, users 
are more likely to perform security activities when they understand the purposes of the security 
program, perceive security measures to be relevant and effective against risks, and when they believe 
they are capable of fulfilling such tasks (Vance and Siponen, 2012, Vance et al., 2012). Thus, users 
are more likely to use their personal resources to comply when they perceive that the organisation is 
upholding their part of a cyber-security system. 
Some organisational resources that could help employees in reducing burnout and improving 
compliance include security response efficacy, individual compliance evaluation, and security 
compliance autonomy (Pham et al., 2016). Security response efficacy comprises the effectiveness of 
organisations or IT departments in communicating and supporting end-users in understanding how to 
comply with security requirements. Response efficacy can be measured in terms of timely and helpful 
IT support; IT staff competences and perceived IT value in the organisation (Pham et al., 2016). 
Response efficacies are required to reduce the impact of IT security systems on employees’ work by 
ensuring compliance time and effort are minimal. For example, a responsive and effective help desk 
can reduce work interruption, offset the effects of decreased productivity, and increase employees’ 
satisfaction (Salanova et al., 2013). Security compliance autonomy represents the independent ability 
of users to use their personal skills in maintaining security compliance. 
Formal evaluation including rewards and sanctions of individual IT effective security compliance has 
been identified as an effective way to motivate on-going compliance. For example, financial rewards 
were found to have an impact on security compliance (Boss et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; 
Siponen et al., 2014). In addition, compliance evaluation should also include penalties for non-
compliance, such as losing a bonus, pay cut or even disciplinary actions. Participants in Pham et al.’s 
(2016) study explained that formal evaluation of security compliance demonstrated the organisations 
took IT security seriously and therefore the individual would work harder to maintain their part of the 
cyber security system. In that study, employees only make information security compliance a personal 
responsibility when the organisation recognise IT security efforts at different levels of achievement, 
including non-performance. However, it is not known how these rewards and sanctions affect security 
overload or burnout. 
Security compliance autonomy is where individuals have an ability to act on IT security issues, using 
their personal skills and competences, in the fulfilment of their roles. In their 2016 study, Pham et al. 
interviewed IT users about IT security. Users favoured security programs that balanced work and 
personal requirements and systems that provided flexibility to respond to demands. Users were not 
pleased with security controls that took away their autonomy in deciding which software settings and 
applications to use for work. Strict control of security settings was perceived to hinder job 
performance and reduce productivity. In the absence of compliance autonomy, users would comply 
passively and simply delegate security responsibility to the IT department, thereby absolving 
themselves from undertaking security tasks at all. The study showed that end-users are seeking to be 
active participants in developing skills that enable and empower them, not passive receivers of 
procedural information (Pham et al., 2017). 
The organisational resources namely organisational security response efficacy, rewards, sanctions and 
security skill use and development discussed above are theorised to reduce users’ perceived burnout 
as they minimise time-consuming tasks, reduce complexity and increase intrinsic motivation to 
complete security tasks. In this study, the ‘organisational resources for security’ construct was 
assessed as a second-order construct within the JD-R model (Bakker and Demerouti, 2007). 
Therefore, we put forward the following hypothesis:
H4: Organisational security resources are negatively related to security compliance burnout
The following section presents a review of how one might use personal resources to deal with security 
compliance burnout.
2.2. Personal resources and security compliance burnout
Another resource available to the employee in fulfilling job demands is personal resources. The 
original JD-R model mainly addresses the influence of work-related factors – demands and resources 
– on people’s stress and job commitment, without incorporating their personal resources (Schaufeli 
and Taris, 2014; Xanthopoulou et al., 2007). Personal resources are mental and emotional self-
competences that can affect how an individual appraises the work environment, copes with stress, and 
recovers from the stressful periods (Hobfoll et al., 2003). Thus, when applied to security behaviour, 
personal resources could be effective in coping with security demands and alleviating the negative 
impact of compliance burnout on compliance behaviour.
One personal resource is self-efficacy, which relates to an individual’s belief in their ability to 
successfully perform their security tasks, as well as to cope with changing requirements. Self-efficacy 
theories are derived from social cognitive theory (SCT) and have been researched in the IT security 
context (Posey et al., 2015). According to SCT (Bandura, 1997) and theory of planned behaviour 
(Ajzen, 1991), self-efficacy influences one's ability to mobilise motivation, deploy cognitive 
resources, and engage with emotional reactions, such as stress and anxiety, in response to a task. IT 
self-efficacy has been shown to affect anxiety related to Information and Computer Technology (ICT) 
(Henderson et al., 1995), motivate continued computer use (Deng et al., 2004), and to help safeguard 
against burnout (Salanova et al., 2000). Further, Xanthopoulou et al. (2007) found that highly self-
efficacious employees adapt better to a changing and challenging work environment, focus more on 
work resources than work demands, and experience higher levels of engagement. Additionally, 
employees’ resources can moderate the tension between work demands, work resources, and 
perceived burnout that influences individual job performance, commitment and satisfaction (Bakker et 
al., 2010; Toner et al., 2012). 
According to Shu et al. (2011), employees with high security self-efficacy are willing to overcome the 
complexities of the security tasks and cope with them more positively, decreasing the level of 
perceived compliance burnout by the employees . Hence, the following hypothesis is put forward.
H5: Security self-efficacy is negatively related to security compliance burnout
Exposure to security incidents, such as a virus infection, losing information, and online fraud causes a 
negative emotional state such as fear, stress or anxiety, which could lower individuals’ belief in their 
security self-efficacy (Rhee et al., 2009). It is feasible that higher levels of exposure increase users’ 
perceptions of threat (Rhee et al., 2009) and lack of ability to deal with security tasks would increase a 
sense of burnout. Rhee et al. (2009) found that prior security failure incidents reduce perceived 
security self-competences, which consequently reduces users’ intention to strengthen security efforts. 
Further to this effect, experiencing a serious security incident (increased exposure) may increase the 
perceived cost of non-compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 2010) and create a negative emotional state, such 
as anxiety or stress and increasing the risk of burnout. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
proposed.
H6: Security exposure is positively related to security compliance burnout 
Figure 1 depicts the theoretical model of this study.
Figure 1: Theoretical model of Security Compliance Burnout
3. Research design
3.1. Measurements
The research constructs employed in this study were measured with previously used measures and 
items provided they satisfied three conditions: (1) they have measured the same concepts as the study, 
(2) they were empirically tested and validated, and (3) they were designed for a similar group of 
participants (Schrauf and Navarro, 2005). The present study examined existing literature in the 
domain of security management, security policies, and security compliance to find relevant scales. 
Some of survey items were adapted and developed for this study. Table 1 shows constructs, 
operational definitions, theoretical sources, and measurement item sources. All variables were 
measured using a seven-point Likert-type scale.
Table 1: Specification of the construct domain and measurement items
Domain Construct Definition/Description Construct 
Sources
Measurement 
items source
Items
Security 
compliance 
overload
Having too many security 
tasks to do in the time 
available 
Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010); Herath 
and Rao 
(2009b);
Vance et al. 
(2012)
Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010)
3
Difficult 
access to 
security 
requirements
Time-consuming access 
and unclear guidance 
from documented security 
policies and procedures.
Adapted from 
Boss et al. 
(2009)
Adapted from 
Boss et al. 
(2009)
4
Organisational 
Security 
Demands
Security skill 
requirements
The pressure to spend 
time and effort in learning 
and understanding IT in 
order to comply with the 
organisation's security 
requirements.
Shih et al. 
(2011)
Adapted from 
Shih et al. 
(2011)
3
Security 
response 
efficacy
Level of satisfaction with 
the clarity and usefulness 
of the organisational 
security resources.
Pahnila et al. 
(2007)
Adapted from 
Pahnila et al. 
(2007)
4
Security skill 
use and 
development
Opportunities to use and 
develop one's skills in 
performing security tasks 
as required by the 
organisation.
Workman et al. 
(2008); Wall et 
al. (1996)
Adapted from 
Wall et al. 
(1996)
4
Organisational 
rewards
Tangible or intangible 
compensation that an 
organisation gives to an 
employee in return for 
compliance with security 
requirements.
Boss and Kirsch 
(2007); 
Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010)
Boss and 
Kirsch (2007)
4
Organisational 
Security 
Resources 
Organisational 
sanctions
Disciplinary actions 
towards non-compliance. 
Sanctions can be 
described in terms of 
financial/non-financial 
Boss and Kirsch 
(2007)
Boss and 
Kirsch (2007)
3
penalties.
Security self-
efficacy
An employee’s judgment 
of personal skills, 
knowledge, or 
competency about 
fulfilling the requirements 
of the security demands.
Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010); Vance et 
al. (2012); 
Workman et al. 
(2008); Rhee et 
al. (2009)
Adapted from 
Rhee et al. 
(2009)
6Personal 
Resources
Security 
exposure 
The extent to which users 
have had direct 
knowledge or experience 
of security incidents in 
their own lives (e.g. 
security issues happening 
to them or to 
friends/family, as well as 
things that they may have 
internalised from media 
coverage).
Rhee et al. 
(2009)
Adapted from 
Rhee et al. 
(2009)
4
Security 
compliance 
burnout
Psychological exhaustion 
and cynicism towards 
assigned security tasks. It 
shows a lack of interest 
and underestimation of 
security issues and 
measures.
Adapted from 
Schaufeli et al. 
(1996); Boss et 
al. (2009)
5
Total items 40
3.2. Data collection and sample characteristics
The sample of this study were employees working in organisations in Vietnam who used networked 
computer applications such as email or accessed networked internet as part of their job on a daily 
basis. It was expected that the relatively large-scale organisations that were selected to participate in 
the survey would have some form of information security policies or security guidance to explain 
proper use of information technology. Further, consistent with other studies, it was expected that 
organisation size would provide an indication of the level of security demands and resources. An 
organisation with a larger number of users will normally have more security demands and provide 
more appropriate security resources. Participants for the survey were recruited through the authors’ 
networks: friends, family members, colleagues, University alumni, and the researchers’ personal 
Facebook pages. To ensure the representativeness of the sample, participants were recruited in various 
industries in three biggest cities in Vietnam including Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi, and Da Nang. 
Vietnam has a high mobile cellular penetration rate at 147 subscriptions per 100 people, and 48.3% of 
the population accessed the internet in 2017 (Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, Foreign Direct Investment Online database). In a 2015 survey by Antivirus and Internet 
Security Solutions (ESET), Vietnam has been ranked lowest in cyber security awareness amongst 
Malaysia, Singapore, India, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Indonesia (ESET, 2015). Over the first three 
months of 2018, Vietnam was ranked 11th in the list of the 20 countries in the world facing the 
highest risk of local infection from removable media connected to computers (USB flash drives, 
camera and phone memory card, and external hard drives); number three for being attacked by Trojan 
cryptos; and placed in top 20 countries where users faced the risk of online infection (Chebyshev et 
al., 2018).  Given the fast growing economy of Vietnam and its commercial connections across the 
globe, it is important to understand the Vietnamese context in order to decrease cyber risks globally. 
4. Data analysis and results
Testing of the proposed theoretical model followed a two-step structural equation model (SEM) 
building approach (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Hair et al., 2010). The first step involved assessing 
the validity of the proposed measurement model. If the measurement model is satisfactorily obtained, 
the second step is to assess the validity of the structural model. Data were analysed using SPSS V.20 
and AMOS V.20.
4.1. Demographic Information
The sample consisted of 443 participants. Most of the participants were between 18 and 34 years old 
(74.7%), an age group that is representative of the relatively young labour force in Vietnam. More 
than 82% of participants had undergraduate (63.1%) and postgraduate degrees (17.9%), 12.7 per cent 
had a diploma, and 6.4% had completed high school. The figures show a relatively high education 
level of the workers in the participating companies. The majority of the participants held non-
managerial positions (71.3%). The top three industries of participants and companies were finance 
and insurance, trading and commerce, and IT-software development at 31.6%, 20.5% and 13.4%, 
respectively. Other industries represented were education (8.7%), transport (8.1%), building and 
manufacturing (6.5%), medical services (3.4%), and others (6.5%). 3.8 per cent of the participants did 
not indicate their industry. Most of the participants (59.2%) worked in companies with workforce 
between 11 and 200 employees. Additionally, 14.6% of participants worked in companies with 200-
500 employees, 16% in large companies with more than 500 employees and 9.9% in companies with 
less than 10 employees. 
As the availability of IT usage policies and the frequency of access to such policies are important to 
security compliance, participants were asked to disclose when they last accessed their organisation’s 
IT policy. This information provided some background on the availability of (organisational resource) 
and users’ engagement with corporate policies about IT security (personal resource).  Table 2 shows 
that 64.2% of the participants accessed an IT policy access within the last 12 months, whilst 18.4% 
had never read an IT security policy, and 17.4% disclosed that there was no IT security policy in their 
current company. A general lack of security knowledge may be explained by these results, indeed the 
significant proportion of ‘never accessed’ and ‘no IT policy’ is an area of concern for those seeking to 
embed IT security in their organisation. While it is feasible that the IT policies do exist and 
participants have been ill-informed, it still indicates a lack of communication about IT security 
overall. 
Table 2: Frequencies of access to IT Policies
Characteristic Value Frequency % Cumulative %
Last month 106 25.3 25.3
Last 6 months 99 23.6 48.9
Last 12 months 64 15.3 64.2
Never 77 18.4 82.6
No IT security 
policy 73 17.4 100.0
Access to IT 
Policies
Missing 24 5.4
Tables 3 and 4 provide data on IT policy access and the level of IT use analysed by company size. As 
shown in Table 3, participants from companies with 500 to 1000 staff reported the highest level of 
policy access in the last six months (65.2%), followed by those from companies with more than 1000 
staff (64%), 11-200 (46.4%), 1-10 (45.3%), and 201-500 (43.1%) respectively. 
Table 3: Access IT policies by Company Sizes
Company size Last month
Last 6 
months
Last 12 
months
Never 
accessed
No IT security 
policy
1-10 12 (28.6) 7 (16.7%) 4 (9.5%) 11 (26.2%) 8 (19%)
11-200 50 (21.5%) 58 (24.9%) 42 (18%) 40 (17.2%) 43 (18.5%)
201-500 11 (19%) 14 (24.1%) 10 (17.2%) 15 (25.9%) 8 (13.8%)
501-1000 7 (30.4%) 8 (34.8%) 2 (8.7%) 1 (4.3%) 5 (21.7%)
Above 1000 11 (44%) 5 (20%) 3 (12%) 5 (20%) 1 (4%)
Total 91 (23.9%) 92 (24.1%) 61 (16%) 72 (18.9%) 65 (17.1%)
Table 4 indicates that the larger the company, the higher use of IT facilities. For example, 91.3% of 
participants from large firms (over 1000 employees) reported a high use of IT, while 66.7% of mid-
size companies (501-1000), 63.8% from both 11-200 and 201-500 sized companies, and only 46.3% 
of very small companies (less than 10 employees) indicated high level of IT usage. Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that larger companies would provide higher level of IT resources and 
requirements to their users.
Table 4: Level of IT use by Company size
Company size High level use of IT
1-10 19 (46.3%)
11-200 148 (63.8%)
201-500 37 (63.8%)
501-1000 16 (66.7%)
Above 1000 21 (91.3%)
4.2. Measurement model
In order to assess the validity of the measurement model, the validity of individual measures were 
assessed by analysing the convergent and divergent validity of the constructs and the overall fit. All 
ten constructs were defined as reflective constructs as the measured items are interchangeable in the 
questionnaire, and each have a common theme (Petter et al., 2007). 
First, reliability of all constructs was tested to ensure the measures of the same construct are related to 
each other, before testing the construct validity. Reliability can be measured using two statistical 
indicators: item-total correlation, which should exceed 0.5 and Cronbach’s alpha (>0.7) (Hair et al., 
2010) (see Table 5). Item ASP2 (“I’m required to know a lot of existing written policies and 
guidelines to security my computer system”) has a lower item-total correlation than the 0.5 threshold. 
This means that a formal requirement to access policies may not be practical to users in the context of 
Vietnamese organisations. Item ASP2 was removed and the final research instrument contained 39 
variables, from ten constructs.
Convergent validity examines whether measured items of the same construct are correlated, which 
can be assessed through factor loading, average variance extracted (AVE), and reliability (Hair et al., 
2010). Table 5 summarises the results of the convergent validity testing of all constructs. Composite 
reliability (CR) values of all constructs were above the 0.7 threshold (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). 
AVE values of all constructs were greater than 0.5 (Hair et al., 2010). Hence, all first-order constructs 
had acceptable reliability and convergent validity.
Table 5: Results of reliability and convergent validity of first-order constructs
Construct Item Item-Total 
Correlation 
(>0.5)
Status Cronbach's 
Alpha 
(>0.7)
AVE 
(>0.5)
SCO1 0.763  
SCO2 0.846  Security compliance overload (SCO)
SCO3 0.741  
0.889 0.737
ASR1 0.594  
ASR2 0.472 Removed
ASR3 0.676  
Difficult access to security 
requirements (ASR)
ASR4 0.638  
0.786 0.567
SSR1 0.689  
SSR2 0.682  High security skill requirements (SSR)
SSR3 0.674  
0.824 0.612
SRE1 0.615  
SRE2 0.646  
SRE3 0.588  
Security response efficacy (SRE)
SRE4 0.525  
0.786 0.507
SSUD1 0.623  
SSUD2 0.773  
SSUD3 0.739  
Security skill use and development 
(SSUD)
SSUD4 0.619  
0.848 0.638
ORW1 0.672  
ORW2 0.758  
ORW3 0.733  
Organisational rewards (ORW)
ORW4 0.692  
0.864 0.597
OS1 0.735  
OS2 0.71  Organisational sanctions (OS)
OS3 0.761  
0.87 0.664
SSE1 0.756  
SSE2 0.799  
SSE3 0.8  
SSE4 0.771  
SSE5 0.739  
Security self-efficacy (SSE)
SSE6 0.772  
0.92 0.650
SE1 0.584  
Security exposure (SE)
SE2 0.514
0.779 0.522
SE3 0.609  
SE4 0.632  
SCB1 0.702  
SCB2 0.769  
SCB3 0.794  
SCB4 0.757  
Security compliance burnout (SCB)
SCB5 0.723  
0.899 0.649
The construct of organisational security resources was assessed as a second-order construct, similar to 
testing first-order constructs: CR and AVE for the second-order construct of organisational security 
resources (OSR) were calculated, and satisfied recommended convergent validity thresholds (see 
Table 6).
Table 6: Results of convergent validity testing for second-order construct of organisational 
security resources
Second-order 
construct
First-order 
construct
CR 
(>0.7)
AVE 
(>0.5)
Convergent 
Validity
SRE
SSUD
OS
OSR
ORW
0.793 0.492 Satisfactory
Discriminant validity looks for differences of correlation among distinct but similar factors. High 
discriminant validity verifies that a construct is unique and the measured items capture a factor that 
other measures do not. Discriminant validity for all constructs was satisfied, as the squared root of 
AVE estimates for two constructs was greater than the correlation coefficients between the constructs 
(see Table 7) (Hair et al., 2010). 
Table 7: Squared root of AVE and correlation between constructs
SCB ASR SSR SCO SSE SE OSR
Security compliance burnout 
(SCB) 0.806       
Difficult access security 
requirements (ASR) 0.347 0.753      
High security skill 
requirements (SSR) -0.028 0.393 0.782     
Security compliance overload 
(SCO) 0.407 0.388 0.116 0.858    
Security self-efficacy (SSE) -0.020 -0.015 0.100 -0.064 0.806   
Security exposure (SE)
0.146 0.242 0.317 0.076 0.434 0.723  
Organisational security 
resources (OSR) 0.016 0.166 0.382 0.154 0.611 0.278 0.703
* The bolded diagonal elements are the squared root of the AVE scores
The resultant measurement model was tested again for model fit. Goodness of fit (GOF) in the 
measurement model indicates the ability of a model to reproduce the data (i.e., the similarity of the 
observed and estimated covariance matrices among measured items). GOF tries to find which model 
reflecting the underlying theory best represents the data. Model fit is one of the most important steps 
in structural equation modelling (Yuan, 2005). The fit statistics are shown in Table 8.
Table 8: Fit statistics of the measurement model
Model Fit Statistics
CMIN = 1281.67
Df = 600
CMIN/df = 2.13
p-value = .00
CFI = .919
RMSEA = .05, 90% CI for RMSEA = (0.049, 0.057)
PCLOSE = .115
The statistics indicate an adequate model fit. The CMIN/DF at 2.13 is almost at the upper bound 2 
cut-off value. The RMSEA at 0.05 is less than the upper limit of 0.07 and the PCLOSE at 0.115 is 
much greater than the upper 0.05 threshold .07 (Steiger, 2007). The 90 per cent confidence interval 
for this RMSEA shows that even with the upper bound, RMSEA at 0.057 is still adequate. The CFI at 
0.919 is above the 0.90 rule of thumb cut-off fit value (Hu and Bentler, 1999).
4.3. Structural model
The testing results of the structural model indicated an adequate fit. The CMIN/DF of the model at 
2.33 was slightly above the upper-bound 2 cut-off value, the RMSEA at 0.05 is less than the upper 
limit of 0.07. Finally, the CFI at 0.90 is lower than the 0.92 threshold for a model of over 30 variables 
(Hair et al., 2010), though it satisfies the 0.90 rule of thumb cut-off fit value (Hu and Bentler, 1999). 
See Figure 2 for a visualisation of results.
Figure 2. Structural model assessment results 
Table 9 summarises the results of the hypothesis testing. Both hypotheses H1 (effect=0.31, p<0.001) 
and H2 (0.28, p<0.001) were supported, though H3 (effect=-0.19, p<0.001) was found to reduce 
security compliance burnout instead, hence H3 is not supported. Hypotheses H4 (effect=-0.02, 
p>0.05) and H5 (effect=-0.01, p>0.05) are not supported due to non-significant relationships at the 95 
per cent confidence interval. Finally, H6 is supported (effect=0.13, p<0.05).
Table 9: Hypotheses testing results
Hypothesis
Standardised Path 
Estimate (Effect)
Hypothesised 
Direction
P-value 
(<0.05)
Supported?
H1: Security compliance overload is 
positively related to security 
compliance burnout.
0.31 Positive 0.001 Yes
H2: Difficult access to security 
requirements is positively related to 
security compliance burnout.
0.28 Positive 0.001 Yes
H3: High security skill requirements 
are positively related to security 
compliance burnout.
-0.19 Positive 0.01 No
H4: Organisational security resources 
are negatively related to security 
compliance burnout.
-0.02 Negative 0.40 No
H5: Security self-efficacy is 
negatively related to security 
compliance burnout.
-0.01 Negative 0.94 No
H6: Security exposure is positively 
related to security compliance 
burnout
0.13 Positive 0.01 Yes
5. Discussion
This study showed that the three categories of security demands had different impacts on compliance 
burnout, while organisational resources and security self-efficacy were not significantly related to 
burnout, security exposure was positively related to it (Table 9). Overall, the theoretical model 
developed in this research explained 25% of the variance in IT users’ burnout (Figure 2), which is 
considered a weak but adequate level for practical implication (Cohen, 1998). Each of the antecedents 
to security compliance burnout are discussed in the following sections. 
5.1. Mixed impacts of security demands on compliance burnout
The structural analysis shows security compliance overload and poor access to security requirements 
were positively related to compliance burnout, whereas high security skill requirements were 
negatively related to it. Security compliance overload was positively related to and had the strongest 
impact on security compliance burnout (effect=0.31, p<0.001) of the three components of security 
demands. The positive relationship between security compliance overload and burnout further 
emphasises the issue of security task overload, where professionals have to work harder and faster 
while simultaneously dealing with multiple applications and tasks (D'Arcy et al., 2014; Lee et al., 
2016). This is consistent with Salanova et al. (2013), who found that completing security measures 
can add to workloads of already stressed staff. IT users in such circumstances struggle to cope with 
workflow disruptions, as well as dealing with security measures. Users can become anxious and tense 
and these negative emotions make sustained concentration difficult. 
The results show that experience of security compliance overload varies depending on several factors.
Organisations may not clearly require IT users to perform security tasks, especially when they place 
more reliance on technical measures than users’ compliance. These organisations may automate most 
security measures and minimise the impact of security compliance on employees’ work. For example, 
Pham et al. (2016) found that some participants did not perceive the workload associated with security 
compliance as significant and did not feel that it negatively affected their work. Organisations may 
not implement security measures to protect their information assets, thus users do not experience the 
their impact on their work (Pham et al., 2016). Users may ignore or delay security tasks. As IT users 
may not exert time and effort to protect the information assets of the organisation, they may not 
experience much compliance overload (Herath and Rao, 2009b).
The results in Table 9 indicate that difficult and time-consuming access to written security policies 
increases burnout (effect=0.28, p<0.001). This finding emphasises that traditional methods of 
disseminating policies and procedures may need to be reviewed. Security requirements and practice 
should be communicated just-in-time, using non-technical terms, possibly with graphic posters to 
decrease stress of access. Complex security documents ‘hidden’ on secure servers should not be the 
main source of cyber security instructions to IT users.
Contrary to the original expectation, high skill requirements significantly and negatively related to 
security burnout instead (effect=0.-19, p<0.01). This finding indicates that users may perceive skill-
demanding security tasks as personally challenging and less tedious (i.e. self-motivating), which may 
encourage them to obtain skills to be more competent and engage in security activities. Moreover, 
Pham et al. (2016) also reported that users may find certain security measures unnecessary or 
excessive and become distant towards overall security initiatives regardless of their security skills. 
Consequently, these users can experience compliance burnout when called upon to perform required 
security tasks, even if they are self-efficacious. 
5.2. Organisational security resources and compliance burnout
The results in Table 9 did not indicate a significant relationship between organisational security 
resources and security compliance burnout (effect=-0.02, p>0.05). Counter to expectations, the 
provision of organisational resources does not reduce IT users’ compliance burnout. 
This counter-intuitive result may be because some security tasks incur personal costs regardless of 
whether or not the organisation also provides supporting resources. For example, IT tasks incur 
response costs, such as additional time, work disruption, or complexity, irrespective of whether there 
are available organisational resources. As these are sunk costs, unable to be changed, this may result 
in users’ burnout notwithstanding the existence of organisational security resources. Additionally, an 
organisation that provides adequate and effective security resources such as technical support, 
training, or rewards for compliance is often one that imposes more security measures and conducts 
more regular security check-ups. The introduction of such extensive measures can affect productivity 
and lead to even higher risk of burnout (Pham et al., 2016). 
Compliance burnout might occur regardless of availability of resources but with different triggers for 
exhaustion and/or cynicism. For example, too many resources (or an inability to engage with 
resources) might contribute to exhaustion, and too little perceived support might contribute to a sense 
of cynicism. 
Effective security resources to assist users’ compliance, however, can result in users’ over-reliance on 
the organisation for protecting information assets. For example, facilitating conditions such as the 
time to learn new skills, easy access to security policies and support to comply negatively influences 
attitudes towards compliance (Pahnila et al., 2007), contrary to the authors’ original hypothesis. An 
explanation for this could be that users believe security responsibilities should be dealt with by the 
organisation through technical measures (Cox, 2012). Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009) explained that 
employees often left complex security tasks to organisations, and underestimated their own roles in 
security protection. This implies that the more effective organisational security resources, the more 
employees are prone to the traditional view that security is organisation’s responsibility, therefore 
they will be less reliant on their own actions.
Finally, some components of security resources, especially rewards, may not actually be available at 
the surveyed organisations. Therefore, their impact on burnout was negative merely because they did 
not exist within the organisation. While several studies have mentioned that organisations rarely 
introduced financial rewards for security compliance (Guo and Yuan, 2012; Hu et al., 2011), the 
concept of rewards and sanctions remains a key area of consideration for compliance motivation 
studies. This is a limitation that needs to be addressed in future research.
5.3. Personal security resources and compliance burnout
The results show that security self-efficacy does not have a significant relationship with compliance 
burnout. This may be due to a work environment where users may not have a substantial number of 
opportunities to use their security skills or requisite security tasks could be simple enough that they do 
not require much security self-efficacy. Furthermore, some security tasks can increase frustration 
from users regardless of their skills. For example, virus scanning may slow down the computer system 
and affect work productivity, and users cannot do much to speed up the process. In such cases, an 
employee can experience fatigue regardless of their self-efficacy due to time pressures and system-
imposed constraints (Moody and Galletta, 2015). In such circumstances, secondary tasks such as virus 
scanning may be ignored to accomplish the primary work tasks. 
6. Implications and future direction
This paper is one of the first studies to examine the sources and mitigating factors of security burnout, 
from both personal and organisational perspectives. The study demonstrates that security burnout is 
real and presents a danger to organisations seeking to maintain secure IT environments. There is 
certainly a ways to go but the role of human factors, as both as a barrier and a facilitator to secure 
cyber environments, cannot be ignored.
The introduction of security measures and polices aimed to protect and guide employees’ cyber 
activities puts more workload and more stress on users. This sustained stress can reduce users’ 
attention and efforts to continue their compliance. Using the JD-R model, a work-stress theory, this 
research showed that burnout may be a result of security-related overload and cumbersome access to 
security policies and instructions. The nature of security when it comes to security compliance is 
potentially a major issue; the more simple and tedious tasks, the more likely the user experiences 
security burnout, regardless of their self-efficacy. Organisational efforts to relieve users of 
responsibility by making things simple may therefore actually have deleterious effects on security. 
This study also showed that easing security burnout can be a challenging task. Both organisational 
and personal resources combined barely reduce security burnout. Users not only need to feel that they 
can respond to cyber security risks (response efficacy), but also need to find such tasks challenging, 
not tedious and repetitive (autonomy-increasing and self-motivating). Consequently, burnout can 
occur regardless of training and development in security or access to organisational resources 
designed to effect cyber secure environments. To prevent burnout, organisations seeking to build 
better infrastructure around cyber security need to decrease the complexity of the task, but not at the 
sake of autonomy and competency, which are major motivators for human performance. 
Future research could identify effective measures in mitigating security burnout in practice, and how 
burnout-free compliance can influence security practice. However, as these results show, a burnout-
free cyber security environment could be one where the user is completely ignorant of security 
initiatives and requirements.
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